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2018-02-19 23:57

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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

Kissinger: "Bosnia Shouldn't Have Been Recognized as a State"

Kissinger talks about the mistake of recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state even tough it had never existed as such previously in history - that is, except for in the Middle Ages under the Serbian Kotromanić dynasty. At the same time he admits that the United States encouraged Alija Izetbegović to go that path when it objected to the Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan of February 1992, which would have made Bosnia and Herzegovina a confederation divided into several ethnic cantons on the model of Switzerland.

But when listening to Kissinger, one should not overlook the real motive for why the Americans gave Alija Izetbegović backing when decelerating the independence of a country where he represented only a minority of 40 percent. For it was not because they were worried Russia was going to break up, as Kissinger states here, but their hidden agenda of undermining the Europeans on their own turf by creating another crisis for them to deal with.

This crisis, which could have been avoided had Alija Izetbegović not revoked his signature from the Carrington-Cutileiro peace plan, eventually developed into a war that was to last for roughly four years. And a war which the Americans - needless to say, after heavy bombardment of the Serbs - solved in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. With it the Americans had at shown to all critics that there was a role of NATO to play even after the Cold War.

Kissinger on Muslim Provocations to Make Case for Intervention

Kissinger explains why he is against any bombing or even taking sides against the Bosnian Serbs, in contrast to other influential American politicians in the likes of Senators Bob Doyle and Joe Biden. When he is asked about the offencive against the Bihać, which was an event that triggered shout for Western intervention, Kissinger describes this as merely an answer to Muslim provocations. This pure counter-offencive was something the Muslims without doubt had set out to provoke from the beginning and was the trigger event that made politicians talk about intervention.

The real motive tough can be find in their firm will of assuring the very existence of NATO in what was then a still uncertain time for the organization - or, in other words, for the hegemony of the United States that was gained over the Western Europeans after the Second World War as NATO became "the institutional link between the United States and Western Europe" (to use Kissinger's own words from an 1995 interview).

Kissinger Explains the NATO Dilema in Light of the NWO

Kissinger talks about the role of post-Cold War NATO which years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was never clearly defined. The United States' firm will to justify the existence of NATO after this overwhelming change can also give an explanation to why there were so many politicians in the United States eager to start bombing the Bosnian Serbs.

All it was about was really putting NATO in use to prove to the world and Europe in particular that the organization had to survive. For the Americans themselves, this was so much important because NATO was the institutional connection between them and the Europeans. They could not allow the Europeans to create their own security system, which was the plan in their strive to be more independent from the Americans after nearly 50 years of protection under Soviet fear.

And when the Americans got the event they they had been waiting for (the explosion at Markale in Sarajevo killing several dozens of people), this aggressive line against the Serbs marked an important part of NATO's history. But it was not as simple as that; it was only after the Serbs had refused to remove their heavy artillery over Sarajevo that NATO could start bombing, which was after the Serbs had been refused an assurance that the Muslims would not attack Serb parts of Sarajevo.

Ending Remarks from Kissinger Concerning the NWO

Kissinger makes some ending remarks about the role of NATO after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Here one will clearly get a glimpse of the clashes fought within the NATO states about which direction to take, especially when Kissinger starts talking about the French.

But ultimately, the Americans got all the Europeans under their umbrella when NATO as a unified force started pounding the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. But the game of securing the future of NATO and with it the hegemony the Americans had obtained over the Western Europeans some forty years before, was fought throughout the 1990's, something which at the end culminated in the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999.

Kissinger on the Siege of Sarajevo

Kissinger lays forward some very thought-provoking views and suggestions on what ought to be done in the Bosnian War to media tycoon billionaire Mort Zuckerman, sitting in for Charlie Rose. They weigh more when you bear in mind that it comes from a man of his importance, who by many is regarded as the most influential American Secretary of State of the 20th century.

Among other things, Kissinger dismisses the notion that the Serbs are separatists in Bosnia and goes on to talk about the West's bombing of the Serbs and the siege of Sarajevo. In line with this perception of the events in Bosnia, Kissinger suggests that the Serbs as well as Croats should be allowed to join their motherlands.

But whilst looking at the interview, one should not forget that it would have been a whole different story had the now-retired man been in office. A former American statesman himself, Kissinger is by no means a saint. It's just that now he couldn't care less about telling the truth, and probably more so when the truth is so obvious.

Kissinger Hints on the Origin of the NATO Wars Against Serbs

Kissinger will go on talking about the role of NATO which was the major issue for American foreign policy throughout the 1990s and came to decide much of how they acted in this period. Two very good examples of this, which are probably the best examples one can come up with, is NATO's intervention in 1995 against Bosnian Serbs and the 1999 intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

What was in fact the hidden motive behind these both "interventions" was of course securing the very existence of NATO. In the case of Bosnia, when the Americans encouraged Alija Izetbegovic to declare independence after revoking his signature from a plan that would have made Bosnia and Herzegovina a confederation, divided into ethnic cantons in the same model as Switzerland, it was to undermining the Europeans on their own turf by creating another crisis for them to deal with - which the Americans themselves, needless to say, after heavy bombardment of the Serbs solved in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accord and with it had found its justification for the existence of post-Cold War NATO.

But the game of securing NATO was not over. The Europeans were still working on their European Security System in their strive to be more independent. And the intervention in Kosovo did not have anything to do with saving the credibility of NATO at that point: as professor Peter Gowan nicely points out in his "The Twisted Road to Kosovo", by the time the bombing was nearing itself, Madeleine Albright and other American officials had themselves repeated how NATO's credibility was at stake so many times that they along with other NATO member states (who until then were not all backing the Americans because they knew what the real hidden motive was) willingly forced themselves and their allies to the point that they had to bomb the Serbs.